



T he year was 1997. Three years had passedsince the exhaustive Uruguay Round had
formally ended and the resultant agreements
signed. But in the minds of thinkers such as
Rohinton Medhora, then team leader of the
International Development Research Centre’s (IDRC)
Trade, Employment, and Competitiveness program
initiative, the ink was taking a long time to dry.
Something was wrong.
The trade negotiations, named after the Latin
American country where they had begun in
September 1986, had revealed major weaknesses in
the region’s negotiating capacity. It seemed to
validate the thesis, expounded a quarter century
earlier by economist and educator Albert
Hirschman, that some countries, Latin American
ones prominent among them, had lost the liberty
enjoyed by sovereign states to set their own policy
agendas. They had become mere “coping states.”
They spent more time reacting rather than acting.
Seven and one-half years of trade talks helped
highlight this regional inadequacy. After Uruguay,
trade negotiations were no longer just about the
selling of sugar, cars, and textiles but, according to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Web site,
covered everything “from toothbrushes to pleasure
boats, from banking to telecommunications, from
the genes of wild rice to AIDS treatment.” 
Those talks, recalls Medhora, “were the first where
the trade agenda was expanded to include what we
now call behind-the-border subjects.” These
include international investment, competition
policy, trade in services, telecommunications,
financial services, export promotion, intellectual
property rights, special and differential treatment,
labour policy and, of course, the environment. In
this expanded discourse, developing countries
often found themselves on the sidelines, unable to
participate fully, uncertain how to respond to this
plethora of issues. The distinction between
domestic and international policy had been blurred
and, says Medhora, the need for “extremely
specialized and sophisticated analytical ability on
the part of trade negotiators” became evident.
Medhora and other participants at a 1997
brainstorming session in Buenos Aires, Argentina
were moved by another piece of evidence of Latin
America’s lack of preparedness for engagement in
the growing international trade-policy dialogue.
Part of a World Bank study questioning the
performance and effectiveness of Mercosur — a
regional trade arrangement established six years
earlier by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay — appeared in the Financial Times.
A well-reasoned response to the publication came
not from Latin America, but from the desk of an
official in the Washington-based Inter-American
Development Bank. 
“In the industrialized countries,” says senior foreign
trade expert Luis Abugattas, “there are hundreds of
think tanks producing policy papers that are
analyzed by the authorities and then used as inputs
for negotiating positions. In my own country, Peru,
there is no university or think tank doing this kind
of research.” He characterized the Latin American
situation as one of “gambling with our countries’
future every day at the negotiating table.”
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
Negotiating the New World 
of International Trade
Research helps Latin America to cope with an expanding trade dialogue
During the late 1990s, in the wake of the Uruguay Round of international trade
negotiations, Latin American nations found themselves literally lost in a plethora of
issues that until then had been foreign to the discourse on foreign trade. They risked
becoming mere spectators in a game that was crucial to their continued survival.
That was when researchers, with IDRC support, got involved, seeking to bring together
different sectors and countries in the region to begin writing a new chapter in the
history of policy-making in the developing world. It’s a lucid and interesting, if still
unfinished, chapter.
There were other problems: the sheer lack of
technical expertise, particularly among the smaller
countries, a “disconnect,” in some cases, between
policymakers and the research community, and
poor coordination among various institutions
within the same government. Something had to be
done. The Buenos Aires session led to an unpre-
cedented mobilization of the research community
to generate the information needed to influence
Latin American trade policy-making and inter-
national trade dialogue in a new and positive way. 
The researcher comes to the table
So, this is how LATN — the Latin American Trade
Network — was born. Just as developed-country
think tanks and research groups were represented
at the negotiating table through the reception of
their insights into their countries’ policy-making
processes, the time had arrived for researchers to
find their place, so to speak, on the Latin American
side of the negotiation room. By December 1997, a
project proposal had been drafted. The following
March, IDRC approved a CA $1.32 million grant to
the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
(FLACSO) to establish LATN. 
Consulting economist Luis Macadar recalled the
objectives of LATN in a recent case study under-
taken to discover whether and how the project had
begun to influence public policy. LATN, says
Macadar, aimed to:
❏ support agenda building and policy formulation
in Latin American countries in response to the
emerging trends and issues in the international
trade system;
❏ harness the existing research capacity in Latin
American countries to engage in international
trade negotiations and contribute to human
resource development; and 
❏ strengthen collaboration among the
participating institutions with a view to
sustaining the long-term goals of the Network.
Many of the people interviewed by Macadar in the
preparation of the case study envision the pursuit
of a regional approach to trade negotiations as an
important complementary objective. In terms of the
research process itself, they stress the importance
of LATN’s coordinating role in drawing upon the
expertise of various national and regional
institutions and in finding “common ground” by
bridging the much discussed divide among
governments, researchers, and the private sector.
Studies undertaken to meet these aims fall into
three groups.
❏ Group 1 comprises wide, overarching issues.
These include the preconditions for the
formation of trade coalitions and the challenges
of bargaining in the context of ever-changing
coalitions. 
❏ Group 2 involves the study, from a Latin
American perspective, of emerging issues,
including the expanding menu of items on the
trade negotiation agenda that has made the
Uruguay Round such an eye-opener. 
❏ Group 3, says Macadar, “consists of country
case studies that aim to identify optimal or
feasible national responses in the context of the
current international trade relations regime for
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.”
The Network that set about fulfilling this ample
mandate in the spring of 1998 comprised a dozen
researchers. Today, it brings together some 35
researchers from more than 30 academic
institutions. The Network also includes policy
officials from Latin American countries, and
colleagues working with a number of international
agencies — academic, nongovernmental, and
intergovernmental. Most LATN researchers are
experienced academics — many, such as the
Network’s director, Diana Tussie, having already
achieved international renown — with broad
experience in the issues addressed by LATN. There
are also a number of young researchers, mainly
Masters or PhD students or graduates of FLACSO.
Perfecting the LATN trade mark
LATN’s focus is simple and pragmatic. It seeks to
deliver policy-relevant research that meets the
needs of the region’s decision-makers — those in
government, but often those in the private sector
as well. An example of this approach is the
research by Tussie and LATN deputy director
Miguel Lengyel on export subsidies. That study
was valuable, given the long-standing importance
of subsidies to key Latin American industries and
the complaints from other countries that such
subsidies conferred an unfair advantage.
Following the Uruguay Round, which defined the
term subsidy and clearly listed acceptable export-
promotion practices, reports Lengyel, “countries
now have their hands tied when it comes to
export-promotion policies.” The study identified
“margins for manoeuvre” that survived the
agreements signed as part of the Uruguay Round
and that were consistent with other bilateral and
multilateral obligations. The two experienced
researchers discovered that measures such as
reimbursing indirect taxes on items like energy
costs, and such policy initiatives as research and
development or training support, continued to be
legitimate.
LATN’s focused approach has also meant following
up on the output of other researchers and
academics in the field of international trade, rather
than yielding to the temptation to generate brand-
new research. Macadar describes what he calls “the
LATN trademark,” the Network’s particular way of
looking at problems, which “involves taking
approaches from the literature and prioritizing
them in a certain way, applying them to a specific
issue related to the trade negotiations.” This
combination includes technical, legal, juridical, and
economic elements. This unique LATN approach
may be summarized as “academic knowledge
applied specifically to a concrete sphere.”
Also, LATN has seen the need to combine firm
focus with creative flexibility. While the objectives
in the original IDRC project proposal remain,
emphases have been adjusted to meet the
changing multilateral agenda, which has
represented a shifting and confusing picture.
Agriculture has emerged as the key issue followed
by competition policy, internationalization of the
multilateral trade rules, safeguard issues,
antidumping, and services. 
Also, emphasis was placed on the policy
formulation process within individual governments
and the importance of adapting it to the needs of
negotiators. The project was also tweaked to place
greater emphasis on education. “The authorities
were much less well informed than had been
assumed in the original proposal,” says Macadar.
The emphasis on education was particularly
important in view of the emerging need to conduct
multiple and simultaneous negotiations and
because of the paucity of published material on
relevant topics in Spanish and with a Latin
American perspective.
Flexibility also required a change in the level at
which LATN’s research output would be targeted.
Given the frequent changes at the ministerial and
deputy-ministerial levels, LATN began to gear its
material toward the middle-level bureaucrat. The
Network recognized the control of information, the
capacity to influence policy-making in subtle ways,
and the responsibility to provide policy continuity
that resided at this middle level.
A dream fulfilled?
Asked whether the dream that motivated him and
a number of Latin American colleagues to come up
with the LATN concept had been fulfilled, Medhora,
now IDRC Vice-president, Program and Partnership
Branch, answers: “Capacity building is a slow
process and we had no illusions that anything
dramatic would happen overnight. But I think if I
were to assess where LATN is today, I would have to
say I am extremely pleased.” As evidence of LATN’s
success, Medhora noted that the Network had
helped spawn similar networks. These include
networks, also established with IDRC support, in
Latin America itself and in South Asia and
Southern Africa.
This positive assessment is reflected in the results
of Macadar’s case study, specifically in terms of the
effectiveness of the project in influencing policy.
An overall study by IDRC’s Evaluation Unit, of
which Macadar’s case study is a part, identified
three major forms of policy influence: expanding
policy capacities, broadening policy horizons, and
affecting policy regimes. Macadar found evidence
of influence in all three areas, but particularly in
the first two. 
❏ Expanding policy capacities: LATN has
demonstrated success in this area, not only by
the quantity and quality of its work, but also by
the innovative ways in which it has targeted its
research activities to ensure that specific needs
in the area of international trade negotiations
and international trade policy are addressed
and that the education, information, and
strengthening of Latin American negotiators can
be achieved. The initiation of a new generation
of academics — many of whom may well end up
as policymakers later in their careers — into this
aspect of social science research is another
example of expanding capacities. 
❏ Broadening policy horizons: This “enlighten-
ment approach” encompasses the research,
information dissemination, and training
through which the Network has helped to
better equip policymakers, negotiators, middle-
level officials, and private-sector representatives
to undertake effective international trade-policy
analysis and decision-making. Various Latin
American governments — those of Argentina,
Paraguay, Peru, and several Central American
countries — have approached the Network for
assistance. Argentina’s Secretary of Trade, faced
with complaints from the footwear lobby about
competitive imports from Brazil, resolved the
dispute with the help of a paper by LATN’s
deputy director and through the author’s direct
participation in the discussions.
This brief was prepared by
Frank A. Campbell based on 
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Regional bodies: including the Andean
Community and the Inter-American Institute for
Cooperation in Agriculture — and Brazil’s National
Confederation of Industries have also sought
LATN’s assistance in trade negotiations. LATN has
helped the World Bank Institute customize its trade
policy courses for the region in an effort that has
also been supported by UNCTAD’s Trade Diplomacy
Program. UNCTAD and the WTO, both of which are
linked to LATN, have identified the Network as a
vehicle through which to strengthen regional
collaboration between their two organizations. The
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has also
associated itself with LATN’s work. Workshops
conducted by LATN brought together negotiators
from various governmental agencies of the same
country, as well as representatives of various
countries and of the private sector, in a non-
competitive environment — often for the first time.
❏ Affecting policy regimes: This “fundamental
redesign or modification” of policies or
programs is more difficult to demonstrate at this
early stage. However, some examples are
beginning to emerge. In developing negotiation
approaches for liberalizing services,
governments, at least in part as a result of the
Network’s input, have been accepting the need
to go to the negotiating table with a number of
options, rather than with a single inflexible
position. The importance of the Network’s
studies and of its Web sites in the preparation
of the background analysis for Argentina’s anti-
dumping and subsidy countervail legislation
was rated very highly. And following an
agricultural seminar organized by LATN to equip
policymakers for upcoming international
negotiations, Argentina’s Ministry of Agriculture
prepared a series of studies that were trans-
formed into manuals that are now found in
every decision-maker’s office.
❏ Timeliness of the research question is a crucial element in policy influence.
❏ Political and institutional factors (including in LATN’s case, the fact that the same person may be
researcher, negotiator, and decision-maker simultaneously or over time) need to be taken into account.
❏ Success may be hastened or hindered by the structure of linkages established by the Network and also
by the approaches to dissemination.
❏ Clarity of objectives must be balanced by flexible responses either to changed circumstances or to the
recognition of gaps in the original project proposal, as in LATN’s switch from publishing research results
in book format to the use of briefing papers when the need for quick,“real-time” information was
realized.
❏ At least in LATN’s case, the fact that policy research responded to policy needs and focused on meeting
those needs was a defining success factor.
❏ The use of public media as part of the dissemination effort may help not only to increase policy
influence but also to establish what may be called policy transparency.
❏ Constructing a single model or approach that is applicable to all countries or even to all those within
a single region is difficult, at best.
Some lessons
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a Canadian public corporation, created to help
developing countries find solutions to the social, economic, and natural resource problems they face. Support is
directed to building an indigenous research capacity. Because influencing the policy process is an important
aspect of IDRC’s work, in 2001 the Evaluation Unit launched a strategic evaluation of more than 60 projects in
some 20 countries to examine whether and how the research it supports influences public policy and decision-
making. The evaluation design and studies can be found at: www.idrc.ca/evaluation/policy
